The assessments of 75 councilors and mayors in eight cities in the Kansas City metropolitan area provide global measures of group organization, activity, and influence in community politics and measures of their specific involvements in 73 issues that arose in these communities. While variations in group involvement and influence -both in exercising social control and contributing to social production -are reported, the most general findings are that groups are less involved in city politics and their limited involvements are less conflictive than suggested by orthodox understandings of pluralist theory. I argue that these results point to the need to reformulate pluralist theory, not abandon it.
In the 21 st century all but the smallest and most isolated local communities are characterized by social and moral pluralism. American cities have increasing racial, ethnic, class, and religious diversity. Their citizens have various interests and hold diverse principles of morality and justice. Despite declines in organizational involvements (Putnam 2000) , citizens also belong to a wide variety of voluntary associations that serve as vehicles for expressing their social identities, pursuing their interests, and developing their principles.
It thus seems ironic that pluralism, as a theory of city politics, has receded from being a primary to a tertiary approach used by political scientists in the study of city politics (Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007, 90) . Pluralism held a more elevated status a half century ago, when Robert Dahl (1961) and many others developed a pluralist paradigm to describe, explain, and vindicate the democratic performance of local communities. Dahl's orthodox pluralism was never as simple as the group theory of politics that held that political outcomes could be explained by focusing entirely on group activity (Bentley 1908, 208) . While groups were seen as organizing different identities and interests, and while group influence was thought to be extensive yet dispersed among many groups, Dahl also stressed that pluralist politics involved such things as the key roles of political leaders, significant "indirect influence" by the unorganized public, and a "democratic creed" comprised of basic normative principles that both influenced political outcomes and constrained group struggle. Yet most disciplinary understandings of orthodox pluralism emphasize the importance of group activity, conflict, and influence. 1 Subsequently, orthodox pluralism was modified and then pretty much abandoned. Even Dahl (1982) stressed problems with this paradigm for understanding community politics. It failed to assess adequately the inequalities in participation, representation, and influence in pluralist politics (Stone 1980) . It failed to account for how certain groups set the agenda of "key issues/ 7 while issues of importance to other groups were neglected and suppressed (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) . It failed to account for how individual and group interests came to be (mis)understood and (under)expressed (Gavanta 1980) . By removing accountable and public-minded public officials from center-stage and accepting the influence of unaccountable and self-interested groups, it seemed to justify abandoning those democratic formalisms that generated political legitimacy (Lowi 1979) .
Such criticisms led to a second generation of neo-pluralisms -for example stratified pluralism, hyperpluralism, and privatized pluralism -each emphasizing that widespread group involvements failed to achieve democratic ideals (Manley 1982; Waste 1986 ) .
Political scientists absorbed these deficiencies in pluralist theory and incorporated neo-pluralist understandings in two ways. Initially, they developed replacement paradigms of community politics -such as the "economistic" perspective of Paul Peterson (1981) , regime theory (Elkin 1987; Stone 1989) , and a "self-governance of common resources" perspective (Ostrom 1990 ) -in which some elements of pluralism were retained but others abandoned.
More recently, political scientists seem to have lost interest in having the study of community politics guided by any paradigm at all, as we witness a proliferation of more specialized research agendas guided by whatever theoretical perspectives seem useful to the question at hand. For example, in one of the few recent studies of the role of groups in local politics, Jeffrey Berry and his associates (200 6) draw on "interest group theory," a perspective that employs concepts from studies of organized groups inside the Washington beltway to examine differences between group involvements at the local and national levels. While there are important gains from such studies, the abandonment of broader paradigms seems anarchic, as scholarship that fails to have any consensus on key questions, concepts, theories, and methods is unlikely to attain the accumulation of knowledge that justifies being acknowledged as a scholarly discipline.
Perhaps urban studies should be multi-paradigmatic, where alternative grand or general theories are developed and evaluated in relationship to one another. The newer paradigms certainly contain important insights, but marginalizing pluralism seems especially unfortunate if political communities are increasingly characterized by social and moral pluralism. Perhaps, orthodox pluralism and various neo-pluralisms are no longer tenable as candidates for paradigm status, but pluralist theory can be and is being reconstructed, especially by political theorists (e.g., Walzer 1983; Eisenberg 1995; Schlosberg 1998; Connolly 2005; Campbell and Schoolman 2008) .
These new formulations question, on both empirical and normative grounds, conceptions of politics where people bring only their self or group interests and whatever power resources they possess to political struggles. They emphasize using public reason to resolve political issues, defending divergent positions in terms of general principles that are broadly accessible, and achieving outcomes that reflect as many principles that are relevant to the issue as possible. In short, a new pluralism is emerging that deemphasizes a politics of group power and that emphasizes the role of diverse ethical and political principles in community politics (Schumaker 2010 ) . Pluralism should not be rejected as a viable candidate for paradigmatic status in the study of city politics simply because scholars have a dated and narrow understanding of it.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to this new pluralism, primarily by arguing that the old emphases on group involvements and conflict are too narrow. Groups surely play roles in community life, but perhaps groups are less important than commonly assumed, and perhaps the nature of group processes has changed. For example, Berry (2010) argues that group involvements at the local level have become less conflictive and more collaborative. New pluralist formulations will have to account for any such changing roles, including how group processes and the pursuit of diverse principles interconnect. While a full account of a new (reconstructed) pluralism is beyond the scope of this paper, I will conclude by providing some notes on its major differences with the old (orthodox) pluralism. In that discussion, I will show that the new pluralism has roots in philosophical claims that are a century old, long before pluralism attained its "orthodox" characteristics. Thus, today's pluralism is both new and a reconstruction of pluralism's origins.
My primary goal will be pursued by presenting findings about group involvements in eight cities during the past decade. The findings presented here are descriptive rather than explanatory. I summarize levels and patterns of group involvements in these cities rather than try to explain or evaluate variances in these involvements. While such variations can be pursued, I
argue that theories and research on group involvements focus on a relatively minor (though still important) aspect of community politics. The descriptions here are provided in pursuit of a larger theoretical objective. If group involvements are less important than commonly assumed, then new formulations of pluralism might direct attention away from groups and toward the development, expression, and accommodation of various moral principles (focusing on what is good for the community), justice principles (focusing on the fair distribution of social goods), and comprehensive political doctrines (such as ideologies and public philosophies integrating beliefs and ideals).
A study of eight communities in the Kansas City metropolitan area
As part of a larger study intended to contribute to the new pluralism, Their participation rate was high, ranging from 77 percent in Overland Park to 100 percent in Lee's Summit. Among the many matters covered in these interviews were their perceptions about the contexts in which they make urban policy, such as how closely their cities corresonded to the various kinds of regime types stressed in the urban politics literature (Kilburn 2004) , as reported in Table 1 . To study group involvements, the interviews were conducted to capture the benefits and offset the limitations of the two major methodological approaches that have been used and contested by community power researchers (Aiken and Mott 1970) .
Prompted by the reputational method, I sought global assessments about the involvements of 24 kinds of groups. During the first interview officials served as informants who rated the overall organization, activity, and influence of each of these groups without regard to their participation in concrete issues. After these assessments were provided, I asked which of these types of groups they regarded as most harmful and helpful to effective city government.
Prompted by the decisional method, officials were also asked during the first interview about the groups that were involved in their particular campaigns to win election to the city council and to provide basic Schumaker UAR revision Oct. 2012 information on what he or she regarded as "the most controversial and/or significant" issues that had arisen recently or were then under consideration. After completing the first-round of interviews in a city, I determined which issues had been most frequently mentioned and had been at least partially resolved (i.e., there had been at least some council votes on the matter). and justice? After brief discussions of these factors, I asked officials to score the importance of each in affecting their voting behavior on the issue, using an ordinal scale that ranged from being irrelevant (0) to being the preeminent consideration for them (5) ; when officials said that they bucked a consideration as when they voted contrary to dominant group pressures, a score of "-1" was assigned. I also asked officials to identify the particular groups that were involved on each side of each issue and to describe their involvements. 4 Pluralist methodologists would regard the information about group influence derived from the examination of group involvements on concrete issues as more credible than the global assessments that were initially gathered. But we shall see that group influence on concrete issues is hard to determine; thus the data generated using "reputational" global assessments help to provide a more complete picture of group involvement in local politics. While not conclusive, the data reported here facilitate global assessments of the involvements of various kinds of groups in city politics, estimates of group involvements in local elections, and important insights into group participation and possible influence on specific policy issues.
They also provide more evidence that group involvements are less adversarial than suggested by orthodox pluralism, and are often collaborative in ways suggested by Berry (2010) . Table 2 rank orders 24 kinds of groups, based on global assessments by city officials of how organized, active, and influential they are in city politics. My efforts to clarify ambiguities about these types of groups can be found in the appendix. While officials were asked to use a 5-point scale ranging from "very low" (1) to "very high" (5), various groups were scored as zero (0) almost 20 percent of the time, when officials claimed a group had no organization in the community, were completely inactive, or without any influence. In only 15 percent of their assessments did officials claim a group to be.highly organized and/or highly active, and they perceived a particular group to be highly influential less than 9 percent of the time.
Global assessments of group involvements
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As indicated by the many scores below "3," officials generally saw groups as more often poorly than well organized and more often inactive than highly active. And they assigned them even lower scores for overall influence.
- Table 2 goes hereNot surprisingly, the "usual suspects" can be found at the top of this ranking: (1) the Chamber of Commerce, (2) neighborhood associations, and (3) developers. Fourth-ranked were community task forces, suggesting that urbanists should pay more attention to this emerging form of community involvement.
The last column in Table 2 provides an index of mean perceived helpfulness, based on how often officials regarded officials as helpful rather than harmful to effective city politics. While officials usually perceived various kinds of groups as neutral in this regard, they more often regarded groups positively than negatively, a finding that supports the argument of Berry and his associates (2006, (14) (15) (16) ) that group involvements in local governance have become less conflictive and more cooperative and collaborative. Rankings based on assessments of helpfulness are quite similar to those based on overall involvement. Perhaps the most significant change in ratings concern developers who are highly ranked in terms of involvements but have a fairly mediocre ranking for helpfulness.
It might be interesting to analyze further the data in Tables 2, but how telling would the results be for understanding how city officials resolve community issues? If groups are relatively uninvolved and if officials see groups as often without influence, then focusing on these ratings could be relatively unproductive. If a paradigm of city politics is to explain how the important decisions of municipal governments are made, it must look beyond the reputed involvements of groups to a broader examination of the various factors that influence policy outcomes in a manner that includes but does not focus too strongly on group pressures. Let us turn then to the relative importance of group involvements in local elections and on the decisions that are made by city councils.
Group involvements in local elections
When asked to identify "the types of groups, organizations, and citizens that were most supportive to your campaign to get elected to the council," seven (of our 75) officials claimed that they were independent of any group, but most claimed to have received some or extensive support from various groups. As shown in Table 3 , business groups (usually the Chamber of Commerce) and neighborhood groups were viewed as more important that political parties and labor groups. Images of elections being waged by Chamber v. neighborhood candidates have some truth but exaggerate their roles, at least in these cities. Officials most often said that their primary support base was comprised of friends and acquaintances who had urged them to run and who had agreed to serve as the steering committee for their campaigns. Perhaps such "grassroots" supporters can be seen as groups, but they serve largely as collections of individuals who make financial contributions and endorsements. Groups are clearly involved in local elections, but in general, the candidates themselves seem to be more central to local elections than groups.
- Table 3 goes here - Table 4 provides some evidence for the idea that city politics is "groupless" (Peterson 1981, 116-119) , as it shows that officials generally regarded group pressures as far less important to their policy-making behavior than a variety of other considerations. They claimed economic concerns and their own ethical principles were normally primary considerations and that citizen preferences (conceived as city-wide and/or as district-wide public opinion rather than as group concerns) were secondary considerations. Officials reported being more influenced by the arguments made by other officials (both fellow councilors and city staff) than by group advocates. The average "group pressure" score of .56 summarizes the finding that 69 percent of the time officials reported group pressures as irrelevant to their voting behavior, while they regarded such pressure as a very important or preeminent consideration less than 2 percent of the time.
Group pressures on 73 concrete issues
-Tables 4 and 5 go hereThe top half of Table 5 shows that officials in each of our sample cities viewed group pressures as minor considerations in how they resolved concrete issues. While group pressure seemed more important in some cities (such as Topeka) than in others, groups were not regarded as especially salient in any of our cities, regardless of their size, composition, location in the metro area, or political regime. The bottom half of Table 5 shows group pressures are generally of little importance on any of the various types of issues that political scientists often see as central to local politics. Peterson (1981) claimed that groups have little influence on issues of economic development and redistribution (labeled here as public assistance)-where, he maintained, economic concerns dominate policymaking -but he suggested that they might still play a role in allocational issues. Sharp (2005) and other analysts of culture wars have since suggested that group are highly involved in moral issues dealing with the regulation of "vices" and "sins" like gambling, homosexuality, consumption of pornography, using illicit drugs, and smoking in public places. Our data suggest that groups are of more importance on moral issues than on allocational ones, but the differences in the role of groups across issue areas is minimal.
Even if there are only minor differences in group activity and influence across cities and policy domains, four general patterns of group involvements were about equally evident across our 73 cases.
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Groupless issues. In about a quarter of our cases, there was simply no significant group involvement. For example, when the Overland Park City Manager proposed a 5~year plan to cut the budget, the Council adopted his plan with no significant group input. When the Lawrence City Commission voted to establish a municipal golf course, they received support from individual golfers but could recall no organized group getting involved in the issue, suggesting that people are golfing alone, as well as bowling alone (Putnam 2000) . Overall, on 18 of our 73 issues, our officials claimed that group pressure was not a consideration in their decisions and failed to name any group that was active and/or influential on the issue.
Issues with ineffectual group conflict.
In about a quarter of our cases, officials identified groups as active on both sides of an issue but could name no group as having much influence on the outcome. On more than a dozen of our issues, officials recognized group conflict but they thought other considerations were far more important to their decisions. For example, issues of banning smoking in public places arose in both KCMO and Lawrence, generating conflict between the owners of bars and restaurants and health professionals (among others), but most councilors regarded the conflicting pressures as off-setting each other, enabling them to focus on the economic and health consequences involved and trying to gauge public opinion on the issue. In Topeka, a citizen advocacy group and a group of social workers supported adding gays and lesbians as a protected class under the city's anti-discrimination ordinance, while some conservative churches and morality groups rose up in opposition. While officials acknowledged these group pressures, they insisted that their decisions were based on their own (prior) moral judgments and estimations of broader public opinion in the community, not group pressures. Group conflict was also apparent on several economic development proposals, but officials saw the outcomes determined by the economic calculations of both potential investors and the city staff. In such cases, some groups won and some lost, but officials doubted they exerted much influence on these outcomes.
Group conflict with "power over." Another quarter of our issues showed a pattern of group conflict and power usually associated with orthodox pluralism. In this pattern, some groups mobilized their organizational resources, became active on an issue, and got some or all of what they sought, overcoming opposition to their demands, and thus potentially exercised a form of influence that Stone (1989, 222-26) calls "social control" or "power over." A budget issue that arose in Kansas City, Kansas, illustrates what is involved in achieving a stringent conception of "power over." Shortly after KCK and several smaller and more affluent neighboring communities formed a consolidated Wyandotte County government, the new Commission of that community sought an 11% increase in taxes to address a variety of needs, including increasing the salaries of public employees. An anti-tax group composed largely of residents of the newly incorporated neighborhoods raised such a howl that the Commission backed off and formulated a compromise proposal that would increase taxes by only 5.5%. But group pressure threatened even this compromise. The commissioner from the newly incorporated neighborhoods, who personally supported the compromise, felt particularly vulnerable to such pressure. With others initially divided evenly in support and opposition of the compromise, his capitulation could have caused it to fail, and this would have been the clearest instance among any issue in our sample of a group exercising controlling power on a community issue. However, just prior to the vote, a bare majority of the Commission (minus the commissioner from the incorporated neighborhood) assembled privately and hammered out an agreement in which each supported the compromise; they then informed the pressured commissioner that his vote was no longer needed (enabling him to vote in accordance with group pressures, knowing that his preferred outcome would nevertheless prevail). This outcome avoided ceding controlling power, by a stringent conception of that term, to the anti-tax group, even though its exercising significant "power over" (in moving the commission toward a compromise proposal) can hardly be discounted.
The "power over" of active groups on other issues that seem to conform to this pattern is harder to access, but to avoid charges of minimizing possible instances of group influence to support my theoretical argument, issues can be identified that involved extensive group involvements on both sides of an issue and where some groups probably should be credited with exercising "power over." In Topeka, a business-oriented task force (GoTopeka) overcame the opposition of anti-tax groups to persuade both city councilors and city voters to accept a .25 percent sales tax increase to be used to facilitate economic development. On three issues, groups appeared to be important in pressuring officials to abandon some initiatives that they otherwise supported. For example, in Raytown a NIMBY group protested a proposal for a low-income housing project, causing its abandonment and prompting an alternative proposal that was more acceptable to the neighborhood protest group because it stipulated that it would house only senior, low-income residents. On four other issues, neighborhood groups protesting economic developments were able to wring certain concessions from developers and city officials, even though these projects were not thwarted.
For example, a neighborhood in northwest Lawrence organized in opposition to a proposed Wal-Mart development, and while they failed to overcome legal concerns that the land-use regulations in place permitted the development, they were able to have the original proposal scaled back and win certain aesthetic enhancements. On ten additional issues where there was significant division on the council, one of two officials acknowledged that group pressures were at least a minor consideration affecting their votes on the issue; even though other considerations were regarded as more important by most councilors, prudence requires that certain involved groups be acknowledged as possibly having "power over" on an issue. For example, in Lee's Summit a group comprised of owners and pilots of private aircraft sought to have a new and longer runway built at the municipal airport in order for it to accommodate corporate jets; the Chamber of Commerce and some other business groups supported the project but residents of a nearby neighborhood organized to oppose it. The Council defeated the proposal, with dissenters pointing to financial constraints and a lack of broad community support for the runway, but perhaps the neighborhood exercised "power over" on the issue.
Consensual issues.
On another quarter of our issues, there was extensive group involvement, but active groups were almost entirely aligned on one side of a policy alternative. In such cases, most of our officials claimed that they reached independent judgments that coincided with a broad community consensus and that their votes were very little affected by group pressures.
On these issues, many groups "won" as they supported adopted policies, but there is no evidence that they exerted significant influence on the council if having influence is defined as overcoming opposition. This pattern is Nevertheless, this pattern may involve another kind of influence, what Stone calls social production or "power to" (Stone 1989, 226-33) . In this pattern, conflict arising from different group interests is minimized, because an outcome is envisioned that promises to further the core interests of various involved groups and because informal processes of collaboration and cooperation lead to consensus. As another example beyond that of the redevelopment of downtown KCMO, consider an issue that arose in St. Joseph.
Hoping to rejuvenate an abandoned stockyard, its Council considered a proposal to develop a pork processing plant there in 2001. But the initial proposal generated intense conflict and was abandoned. When another corporation, Premium Pork, proposed an alternative plant in that location that avoided the worst features of the original plan, various community groups rallied behind it and no significant opposition arose. Premium Park was the single group most responsible for this successful outcome and can be credited with facilitating the "social production" of a widely sought goal.
In other cases in this pattern, some groups clearly contributed to "social production" and exercised "power to," but it is no straight-forward matter to assess the distribution of influence among the various collaborating groups.
However, when a group initiated an issue (or an aspect of a broader issue) or when it took a lead role in assembling various collaborating groups and when a majority of officials regarded the group as having at least some influence over their decisions, I treat it below as having possible "power to."
The involvements and influence of various kinds of groups. Table 6 summarizes officials' assessments of group involvements on our 73 issues.
Minority, ethnic, women, GLBT groups, bankers, and political parties were involved in at most one of these issues, so they are omitted from the table.
Other groups are classified on the basis of the coalitions emphasized by urban analysts (e.g., the growth machine and countervailing forces to it) or on the basis of having similar characteristics (e.g., occupational groups).
The differences among groups within these coalitions seem sufficiently important to warrant their separate examination as reported in the table and discussed below.
- Table 6 goes here -Let us first consider four types of groups that were most active in initiating issues. First, national corporations initiated six issues by proposing to build such enterprises as a NASCAR speedway as a centerpiece to a new "West Village" development in KCK, the Wal-Mart in Lawrence, and the pork processing plant in St. Joseph.
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In each case, councils approved and sometimes subsidized these projects in various ways. National corporations always "won," by getting the policies they sought. In half of these cases, they also overcame significant group opposition and thus could be regarded as exercising "power over." But in the other three cases, they engaged in collaborative political processes lacking any significant opposition, helping to produce a widely sought policy goal. National corporations are credited with exercising "power to" in these cases.
Second, local developers were involved in 13 issues, initiating eight of them. On two such occasions, they withdrew their proposals for financial reasons; in terms of the outcomes of public policy, they were neither winners nor losers on these issues and ended up with no influence on them. On five such occasions, they encountered no organized opposition, and were generally credited with exercising "power to" by officials. On one issue initiated by a developer and on two other issues where developers organized to resist new regulations proposed by the council, the opposition of other groups had to be overcome. On these three cases the developers are acknowledged as having exercised "power over" because they got what they wanted. On the other issues, developers and oppositional groups engaged in classic group struggle that resulted in five "ties," due to concessions that developers made in order to get their projects approved. Officials offered different judgments about whether developers exercised more influence than they conceded in these issues, and so I note these cases with a question mark in Table 6 .
Third, citizen advocacy groups, understood as community-wide ad hoc organizations pursuing a particular policy outcome, initiated a couple of issues -a hate crime ordinance in KCK and a living wage ordinance in Lawrence -and such groups were involved in campaigns in Lawrence and KCMO to ban smoking in public places and in Topeka to include gays in the city's anti-discrimination ordinance. They lost only in Topeka, but their influence on the two issues in which they won is unlikely. While a few officials credited them with important roles on these issues, they thought other considerations were much more important.
Fourth, community task forces were involved in 16 issues. Forming task forces and involving them in the policy process was the most important "governmental structure" issue in Lee's Summit, as the community made a commitment to form task forces around those issues that had previously generated extensive group conflict. They sought to include members of competing groups in these task forces, which could serve as forums for understanding group differences and seeking proposals that minimized disagreements. As a result, task forces played a major role in three issues that were resolved with little group opposition in Lee's Summit. Their neighbors in Raytown emulated this approach, forming task forces to address five of the issues studied there, but in Raytown group opposition persisted to several task force recommendations. Overall, task forces were highly successful, as their proposals were normally adopted. But while most officials supported task forces and their recommendations, they seldom cited them as being highly influential. While the reciprocal relationships between councilors and task forces are hard to sort out, it may be that officials saw task forces as vehicles for gathering support for policies they preferred, rather than being swayed by the recommendations of task forces. Given the uncertainties involved, I credit task forces as potentially exercising "power over" or "power to" -depending on whether their recommendations were adopted with or without the opposition of other groups -on ten occasions, but I also note by the question marks, the uncertainties of attributing influence in these cases. Table 6 details the involvements, wins, and potential influence of other types of groups. Perhaps most noteworthy are the records of additional groups that are often seen as dominating local politics.
The Chamber of Commerce was involved in almost a third of our issues, and accumulated an impressive won-lost record, but local Chambers never initiated an issue and were most involved in the consensual pattern of group involvement noted above. Officials never credited them with exercising more than minor influence on any issue.
Service providers, an eclectic group ranging from those agencies that provide social services to private trash haulers, were involved in 13 of our issues. They too had impressive won-loss records but were seldom seen as influential. Only Marillac, a consortium of agencies providing mental health care for children in Overland Park, possibly exercised "power over" when council officials granted it the zoning to build on a site despite NIMBY opposition. And various health care providers in KCMO may have exercised "power to" when they led a group of community organizations that resulted in council and voter approval of a property tax increase to provide better indigent health care.
Neighborhood groups were involved in 18 of our issues, protesting proposed developments and housing redevelopment projects about half of the time and being part of a group consensus in pursuit of a public goal on the other occasions. More than any other type of group, their efforts had mixed results, as they got some concessions from developers that shielded a neighborhood from the worst effects of projects. While they had some influence, scored here as "power over," on four of these issues, they were not cited as exercising significant "power to," as leaders on issues having consensual patterns of group involvement.
Public employees -especially firefighter and policemen associationswere involved in seven issues in support of increased taxes and compensation.
While they won more than they loss, their records are not as exceptional as portrayed recently by various state executives and legislators proposing and passing legislation to curtail their influence. Usually, no significant opposition materialized in opposition to their receiving some sort of increased benefits. Only on the previously discussed tax compromise in KCK did they seem to exercise some influence.
Anti-tax groups were active, but not very influential, on seven issues in our sample. As mentioned, they were probably influential in getting KCK commissioners to cut their proposed tax increase in half, but they could not achieve the greater reductions they sought. In Raytown, a proposed increase in sales taxes was defeated; while few councilors attributed that outcome to an active anti-tax group, their having had some influence cannot be completely discounted. On the other five issues in which anti-tax groups were involved, they were unsuccessful.
The overall pattern that thus emerges from Table 6 is of considerable group involvement and of more wins than losses for groups involved in local issues, but groups most often succeeded because officials adopted policies they supported for reasons other than group pressures. While some groups may have exercised some "power to" and "power over" on a limited range of issues, that influence was widely distributed. Perhaps community task forces comprised of coalitions of city officials and groups with stakes in particular issues have become quite influential in community politics, but more "special interest" groups generally did not dominate city politics and no particular such group had broad influence in the resolution of issues of any city in our sample.
Conclusions about group involvements
Although city politics is not "groupless," groups are less central to local government than suggested by group theory. Communities suffer from less group domination than suggested by the neo-pluralist models that emerged from criticisms of Dahl's orthodox pluralist theory. Overall, officials provide global assessments of groups as generally not very well organized, not very active, and even less influential in city politics. While they recognize that some types of groups -like business and neighborhoods -are more involved and helpful than others, and while they see such groups as important supporters during their electoral campaigns, they do not regard themselves as deeply beholden to such groups and they do not see groups as being very influential on many issues. . While this study does not include the longitudinal data that enables assessments of changes in group politics at the local level, our overall findings seem similar to those from an extensive study of 82 cities in the San Francisco Bay area conducted during the 1960s (Zisk 1973) . However, there may be some groups -like task forces, service providers, citizen advocacy groups, and GLBT groups -that are more involved than before and that deserve greater attention than they have received from urban scholars. And some groups -perhaps civic groups (Putnam 2000, 440-444) and banks (Berry, et al. 2006 : 4-5) -may be less involved than previously. But such matters may be sideshows to a more general understanding of city politics. If urban scholars want to explain the decision-making of urban officials, focusing on those group actors that seldom have influence seems to be more a distraction than a productive enterprise. But if they want to continue to examine groups, they should focus at least as much on group collaboration as on group conflict.
Beyond orthodox pluralism
Those involved in the study of community politics might seek scholarly understandings not only of how urban policy is made but whether urban politics conforms to some normative concerns of good and just governance and whether more democratic politics is possible (Fainstein 2010) . Perhaps some of the new models of local politics such as regime theory and the common-pool resource approach will emerge as paradigms that effectively address these concerns, but pluralism should be included among the candidates for paradigm status in the discipline. Properly understood, both the old and the new pluralisms have sought to understand how communities do and should govern themselves democratically, in a manner that reflects their own goals and values in contexts of moral pluralism, where there are differences among citizens and leaders about the community goals to be pursued and the values to be given priority. More than any other paradigm, pluralism challenges monist conceptions of politics. If communities have been dominated by cohesive social or economic elites, pluralism claims that broader democratic processes can be developed. If communities exhibit systematic biases in favor of (white) majorities, pluralism stresses the greater inclusion of minorities. If communities seem to be constrained by economic imperatives, pluralism reminds us that other social values can be emphasized.
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While there are continuities in pluralism over the past century, there are very important differences between the old (orthodox) pluralism and a new (reconstructed) pluralism having roots in philosophical considerations of social and political heterogeneity that preceded"Dahl and his followers (Eisenberg 1995; Menand 2001, 377-408) . While there is a long tradition of analyses on changes in pluralism over the years (see, for example, Manley 1982 , Brand 1985 , McFarland 2004 , Campbell and Schoolman 2008 , the distinctions provided here are intended to persuade urban scholars that the orthodox pluralism that they have largely abandoned is not the pluralism that is now central to political theory and that might rejuvenate the urban politics field. While a full articulation of this reconstructed pluralism cannot be provided here, the major differences between the old and new pluralism can be briefly outlined.
While the developers of orthodox pluralism sought to establish a valuefree, behavioral paradigm for the study of community politics, the new pluralism places values at the center of analysis. As political science became post-behavioral in the 1970s, neo-pluralists offered value judgments on deficiencies in community politics (Dahl 1982) and even explicitly introduced democratic values into subsequent evaluative analyses (Schumaker 1991) . New pluralists are more descriptive than judgmental about the many values that are expressed in and about community politics, but they do produce research findings that can be used to evaluate shortcomings in the representation of value diversity and that help identify the conditions that promote the better representation of those values that have been neglected, marginalized, or excluded (Young 1990 ).
While orthodox pluralism viewed a diversity of expressed (and thus observable) group interests within political communities as the ontological starting point of their analyses, new pluralists revert back to William James' insistence that diverse individual values are the fundamental feature of human existence (Ferguson 2007) . Political actors have many values -such as aesthetic judgments, personal identities, and ethical principles -that influence'their political preferences and actions, and these values may or may not align with their self or group interests. Political communities are characterized not only by different group interests but by political agents bringing to community decision-making a wide variety of moral principles about the good society (Madsen and Strong 2003) , justice principles about the fair distribution of social goods (Walzer 1983; Michelbach, et al, 2003) , and comprehensive religious, moral, and political doctrines (Rawls 1993) . While orthodox pluralists were preoccupied with discovering whose and which interests were most reflected in the outcomes of community issues, new pluralists also seek to discover whose and which principles of morality and justice are reflected in community decisions (and nondecisions).
While orthodox pluralists limited their conception of the common good to descriptive statements about broad acceptance of a "democratic creed" featuring abstract political rights and procedural norms of fair play (Dahl 1961, 309-325; Dahl 1989, 208-308) , new pluralists are concerned with a broader conception of the common good. They stress that political order requires an "overlapping consensus" on a wide array of political principles (Rawls 1993, 133-172) , but they do not claim that there is any universal justification for the norms that are dominant within particular communities.
They acknowledge that a "Kantian sensus communis" or "common sense") can be used to maintain dubious subjugation of and hostility toward some people and their values that depart from any pluralist consensus (Schoolman 2007, xiiiix) . New pluralists thus seek to describe and explain (both causally and functionally) the values that constitute an overlapping consensus within pluralist communities, but they remain very attentive to the values of those who criticize common sensibilities (e.g., Connelly 2005).
While orthodox pluralists focus on the power resources and influence that various groups bring to political issues and stress how the dispersion of power resources and influence leads to negotiation, compromise, and outcomes that are relatively responsive to many groups within the community, new pluralists stress that the emergence and resolution of community issues reflect not just applications of power but the moral and justice principles that are brought to bear on issues (Scott and Bornstein, 2009; Schumaker and Kelly, 2012) . Orthodox pluralists may concede that groups articulate principles on behalf of their interests, but (perhaps with an inadvertent nod to Marxism) tend to regard these principles as little more than camouflages for interests, not as factors that are at least partially independent of interests. In contrast, new pluralists regard policy processes as often including deliberation where participants use public reason to resolve issues in ways that reflect various principles judged relevant and of high priority to the specific issue under discussion. How values are framed into principles can matter for outcomes. For example, those agents who wish to promote public assistance for the poor seem better served by claiming that municipal governments have a responsibility to provide social minimums on essential goods than by claiming that the poor have welfare rights that such governments must accommodate (Schumaker and Kelly, forthcoming) . Other important concerns about urban politics can be fruitfully explored and eventually assembled into a coherent new pluralistic perspective on politics. Overall, the new pluralism facilitates analyses of the values at stake in community politics in ways that facilitate value judgments by the consumers of our research without imposing on that research our own, inevitably partial, value judgments. Missouri communities that comprise the data base for this paper, four cities in California were also included in our larger study on the role of ethics in urban politics, but they are omitted here because we gathered much less information about group involvements on concrete issues there than in Kansas and Missouri. However, the limited data we gathered on groups in California support the broad findings reported here.
3
Many of these issues were not resolved until after the interviews were completed, prompting some subsequent call-back phone interviews and delaying the completion of this project. Depending on elected officials to provide assessments of group involvements might be regarded as a major limitation of this study, but previous research in one of these cities (Lawrence) revealed that interviews with both councilors and group leaders provided very similar assessments of group involvements (Schumaker 1991, 155-162) . Of course, interviews with group leaders could provide information about group characteristics that could impact their invovlements, but this was not the concern of this study.
Interviews with participants in broader policy networks could provide information of group involvements beyond the issues resolved by city councils, but the concern of the larger project from which this paper is drawn was to understand the policymaking attitudes and behaviors of elected city officials.
It is also noteworthy that the involvements of groups in Lawrence during the time period of the first study (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) were remarkably similar to those during the time period of this study (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) .
5
As a result of learning (during the second round of interviews) more about the kinds of groups that were actually involved in city issues, I came to regret some aspects of this list and the definitions provided. For example, I
wish I had distinguised civic groups from service providers, especially given the increasing role of service providers in local governance (Stein 1990 ).
Indeed, I wish I had sought assessments of two separate kinds of service providers -nonprofits and for profit organizations (Lamathe, Lamathe, and Feiock 2008) . I also wish I had used the term "advocacy groups" rather than "community action groups" and emphasized the "city-wide" composition of such groups as stressed by Berry (2010) . 6 Berry (2010) argues that, in contrast to national interest goups, activity is more important than organization to the amount of influence that local groups achieve. Although these two aspects of group involvement are highly correlated in our data set (r = .92 for all 1800 observations), influence is, as Berry suggests, more closely associated with activity (r = .90) than with organization (r = .84).
7
Characterizing particular issues according to which of these patterns it corresponds and estimating the power of various groups on each issue involve judgments by both interviewees and researchers/ thus a language of precision is often abandoned for one of approximation in what follows. 8 National corporations are hardly "local groups" as that term is most often used in the literature, but they are included in this analysis because they are part of civil society and because I am here pursuing an inclusive assessment of group involvements. Another commonality between the old and new pluralism is their recognition that important political decisions often take place in settings other than city hall. For example, the old pluralism recognized the involvements of actors at various levels of government. And the new pluralism recognizes that decisions can be made by informal regimes and by policy networks.
Appendix: definitions and examples of group types
When presenting officials a list of 24 types of groups to provide the assessments shown in Table 2 , they often asked for clarifications. The definitions and examples provided for them are as follows:
With respect to Democrats, Republics, and other parties, the concern is with the involvements of local party organizations in city politics.
National and global businesses refer to those corporations that are active in national and global markets respectively and that are located in the city or propose to locate in the city.
Neighborhood groups include neighbors who organize on an ad hoc basis to address a particular issue (such an a NIMBY), as well as on-going neighborhood organizations.
Community action groups are grassroots organizations that seek to mobilize local residents to address a particular social problem. ACORN is a national example. A local policy advocacy group, such as one organized to pursue a living wage ordinance, is another example.
Professional associations include both local chapters of national organizations of such professions as lawyers, doctors, and architects, and ad hoc groups of members of a particular profession that mobilize on a specific local issue.
Nonprofits include civic groups like the Rotary and Optimist Clubs that have community service missions and such nonprofit service providers as social service agencies.
Clientele groups concern both permanent and temporary associations of people who use or seek to use particular city services, such as residents who use transit services or depend on public health facilities.
Minority groups promote the interests of Black, Hispanics and Native Americans in the community.
Ethnic groups promote the interests of other minorities like ArabAmericans and Asian-Americans, or of identifiable nationality groups such as Italian-Americans, Jews, and Russians.
GLBT groups pursue rights for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals.
Morality groups organize to combat what they regard as sins (e.g., having an abortion) or vices (e.g., consuming pornography).
Task forces are organized by public officials to facilitate dialogues among diverse community interests and arrive at citizen-based recommendations regarding specific pubic issues. Table 4 2 Eight to ten concrete issues were studied in each city, including one or two of the various types of issues listed in the bottom half of the 
